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SOMEWHERE TO RUN, SOMEWHERE TO 
HIDE?:  INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF 
HUMAN SUBJECT EXPERIMENTATION 
ADAM H. LAUGHTON* 
INTRODUCTION 
The pharmaceutical industry is one of the most important players 
in the field of clinical research on human beings.  Increasingly in 
recent years, “Big Pharma” in the United States and elsewhere has 
turned to foreign populations to test its new products.  The purpose 
of this note is to examine how existing sources of quasi-legal and 
ethical regulation address the troublesome issues raised by this 
increase in international human experimentation.  First, the note 
gives a brief history of human experimentation and its regulation, 
giving special focus to the events of the twentieth century that have 
most affected the development of the bioethics movement.  Next, it 
describes and compares several instruments of international 
regulation of human subject experimentation.  Finally, it examines 
some of the difficult ethical issues associated with international 
research on human subjects.  In this discussion, the greatest amount 
of attention will be given to clinical trials performed by the 
pharmaceutical industry.  Other types of international research on 
human subjects exist, but research by the pharmaceutical companies 
poses its own special regulatory and ethical problems. 
I.  HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
A. Pre-Nuremberg 
Though the Holocaust and the concurrent Nazi experimentation 
on prisoners and Jews1 brought unprecedented attention to 
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experiments on human subjects, such experimentation and ethical 
reflection thereon began much earlier.  One of the earliest codes of 
medical ethics was the Hippocratic Oath.2  The Hippocratic Oath’s 
focus is on care that directly benefits the patient; however, as in many 
early documents regarding ethics and human experimentation, that 
benefit is determined by the doctor and not the patient.3  While the 
oath does not directly address human research,4 the issue of 
delegating decision-making to physicians arises in later international 
codes and agreements on human experimentation. 
Perhaps as a result of the lack of attention to human subject 
research, experimentation continued unabated and largely 
unregulated until the 19th century.5  In 1803, Thomas Percival, an 
English physician, promulgated a code of medical ethics that dealt 
directly with human experimentation.6  Like the Hippocratic Oath, 
Percival’s code is decidedly skewed towards the interests of 
physicians and experts.  There is no mention of consent or other 
protections of human subjects.7  The first American code of ethics 
dealing with human experimentation was created by William 
Beaumont in 1833.8  The most important aspect of Beaumont’s code, 
in comparison with that of Percival, is that it recognizes the necessity 
of the subject’s voluntary consent and requires that experimentation 
cease if, at any time, the subject is “distress[ed]” or “dissatisfied.”9  In 
1865, the French physiologist Claude Bernard published his own 
guidelines governing human experimentation, which precluded any 
human experimentation that would not be of direct benefit to the 
patient, no matter its value to science.10  However, the valuation of 
that benefit remained in the discretion of the physician. 
Ironically, one of the first official regulations of human 
experimentation came out of the Prussian government in 1900,11 
 
 2. See Michael A. Grodin, Historical Origins of the Nuremberg Code, in THE NAZI 
DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 121, 
123 (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992). 
 3. Id. at 123-25. 
 4. Id. at 123. 
 5. See id. at 124 (giving examples of human research involving experimental vaccinations 
of children and prisoners). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 125. 
 8. See id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 125-26. 
 11. Id. at 127. 
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which was then part of the German Empire.12  The Prussian directive 
expressly prohibited non-therapeutic research either on incompetent 
individuals (including children) or where the subject had not given 
“unequivocal[]” consent to the procedure after having it explained to 
him.13  Historical records and contemporary press reports show that 
these guidelines were largely ignored by German medical researchers 
throughout the decades between their promulgation and 1931—when 
new guidelines were introduced.14  These new guidelines were 
generated by the Reich Health Council and published by the Reich 
Minister of the Interior in response to reports of lax ethical standards 
among German medical researchers.15  The new standards were 
among the most comprehensive and protective of the patients’ 
interests, as compared with other codes of ethics then extant.16  
Experimentation on dying persons was strictly prohibited and 
research on minors was circumscribed.17  The Reich Circular required 
that human research be carried out only after laboratory testing and 
animal studies were completed.18  Furthermore, it required informed 
consent of patients and introduced more extensive protections for 
“scientific experimentation” (non-therapeutic research) than for 
“innovative therapy” (therapeutic research).19  These German 
regulations are particularly relevant because they were the standards 
that existed at the time of the Nazi experiments, and against which 
the Nazi doctors at Nuremberg themselves wished to be judged.20 
B. The Nuremberg Doctors Trial 
The precipitating crisis of the modern bioethics movement was 
the extensive and cruel human experimentation performed on 
 
 12. See Historical Atlas of Europe, Complete Map of Europe, Year 1900, 
http://www.euratlas.com/history_europe/europe_map_1900.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2008). 
 13. Grodin, supra note 2, at 127. 
 14. Id. at 128-29 (detailing the following problems: “placing the lives of small children on 
the same level as those of . . . rats[,] . . . mental and physical torture[,] . . . disgustingly shameful 
abominations in the name of science run mad[, and] . . . discrimination between the rich and the 
poor”). 
 15. Id. at 129. 
 16. Id. at 129, 131-32. 
 17. Reichsgesundheitsblatt 11, No. 10, 174-75 (Mar. 1931), reprinted in 31 INT’L DIG. OF 
HEALTH LEGIS. 408, 408-11 (1980). 
 18. Id.  Interestingly, a 1933 law by the Nazis effectively prohibited experimentation on 
animals but left the guidelines otherwise intact.  Grodin, supra note 2, at 132. 
 19. See Reichsgesundheitsblatt, supra note 17. 
 20. Grodin, supra note 2, at 126. 
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prisoners of the Nazi regime and the subsequent trial of twenty-three 
Nazi doctors at Nuremberg, Germany beginning in December 1945.  
During the Nazi regime, the practice of medicine was perverted from 
its typical purposes of healing and aiding the sick and suffering and 
was used instead to promote “ideas and solutions to the racial 
problems” that the Nazis perceived were a plague on their country.21  
This shift could represent a compelling explanation of why German 
medical science moved away from the high ethical and professional 
standards that it had previously set22 and toward the realm of pseudo-
science and torture.  The Nazi doctors performed a wide variety of 
human experiments on prisoners (particularly Jews and gypsies) 
during the course of the regime, including extended immersion in 
cold water, extreme exposure to high-altitude conditions, exposure to 
military biochemical agents, and sterilization.23  Often, these 
experiments resulted in death (as they were designed to do).24 
At the conclusion of the Nuremberg trial, fifteen of the twenty-
three doctor defendants were found guilty, including Karl Brandt, 
who had been Hitler’s personal physician and Reich Commissioner 
for Health and Sanitation, one of the highest-ranking positions in the 
Nazi medical system.25  Seven of these fifteen were sentenced to death 
by hanging and the rest were sentenced to prison terms of various 
lengths.26  Alongside the final criminal judgment of the defendants, 
the Nuremberg judges enumerated ten principles regarding 
acceptable human experimentation.27  The proximate origin of these 
principles was the contributions of two key experts for the 
prosecution, Dr. Leo Alexander and Dr. Andrew Ivy, who drew on 
historical sources such as the Hippocratic Oath.28  Dr. Ivy testified at 
trial and Dr. Alexander had drawn up a memorandum for the judges, 
each focusing on ethical principles related to human 
experimentation.29  Today, the Nuremberg Code is probably “the 
 
 21. Joel Levi, Medicine, the Holocaust, and the Doctors’ Trial, in BIOETHICAL AND 
ETHICAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE TRIALS AND CODE OF NUREMBERG: NUREMBERG 
REVISITED 111, 114 (Jacques J. Rozenberg ed., 2003). 
 22. See supra Part I.A. 
 23. HORST H. FREYHOFER, THE NUREMBERG MEDICAL TRIAL: THE HOLOCAUST AND 
THE ORIGIN OF THE NURSEMBERG MEDICAL CODE 26-37 (Peter Lang ed., 2004). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Levi, supra note 21, at 116, 124. 
 26. Id at 124. 
 27. Grodin, supra note 2, at 121. 
 28. Id. at 134. 
 29. Id. 
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most accepted” and “the most cited” medical code of ethics.30  More 
will be said about the content of the Nuremberg Code in Part II.A of 
this Note. 
C. Other Human Experiments Outside of Germany in the 
Twentieth Century 
It is important to remember that during World War II, and even 
after, unethical human experiments were not being carried out solely 
by the Nazis.  Other countries, including Japan and the United States, 
carried out similarly brutal and unethical experimentation.  The 
Japanese used U.S. prisoners of war (POWs) in their biological 
warfare experiments in China.31  Other weapons, such as 
flamethrowers and grenades, were tested on human subjects, 
including Allied POWs and Chinese living in the areas surrounding 
concentration camps.32  Finally, a horrifying array of live human 
vivisections, amputations, and experiments involving exposure to 
various extreme conditions (pressure, centrifugal force, deprivation, 
hunger and thirst) were performed by the Japanese on human 
subjects.33  Despite the gruesome nature of their crimes, often similar 
to those for which the Nazi doctors were punished, many Japanese 
doctors were offered immunity from prosecution by the United States 
in exchange for disclosing the results of their experiments.34 
Perhaps most troubling from the American point of view is the 
behavior of American scientists after the war with regard to human 
experimentation.  One example was a series of human radiation 
experiments carried out with the support of various bodies of the 
federal government throughout the first thirty years of the Cold War 
(roughly 1940s-1970s).35  Over seven hundred American patients, 
including terminally ill hospital patients, were used as part of thirty-
 
 30. Levi, supra note 21, at 116. 
 31. George J. Annas, The Nuremberg Code in U.S. Courts: Ethics versus Expediency, in 
THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN 
EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 2, at 201, 202. 
 32. See Christopher Hudson, Doctors of Depravity, THE DAILY MAIL (UK), Mar. 2, 2007, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/pages/live/articles/news/news.html?in_article_id=439776. 
 33. See id; Shane Green, The Asian Auschwitz of Unit 731, THE AGE, Aug. 29, 2002, 
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/08/28/1030508070534.html. 
 34. Annas, supra note 31, at 202; see also Hudson, supra note 32. 
 35. George J. Annas, Questing for Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal, and Self-Deception in 
Postmodern Medical Research, in HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 312, 316 (Jonathan M. Mann 
et al. eds., 1999). 
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one experiments.36  Later reports indicated that the patients were 
given no information about the purpose of the experiments, and 
consent was not part of the research protocol.37  In one dramatic 
example, a man had plutonium injected into his leg, which was then 
amputated for study.  The man was subsequently unable to work or 
support himself.38  A federal judge, in a lawsuit by the families of the 
subjects (most now dead), stated that the patients had allegedly been 
treated “as though they were laboratory animals.”39 
Another infamous example of American human experimentation 
during the Cold War concerns the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
MKULTRA experiments.40  In its MKULTRA research and related 
experiments, the CIA was interested in the effects of drugs, hypnosis, 
and radiation for purposes of mind control and interrogation.41  One 
of the arms of the MKULTRA experiments involved administering 
LSD to “volunteers” who were unaware of the nature of the 
experiment to which they would be subjected; other truly non-
volunteer subjects were randomly slipped LSD in bars in New York 
City and San Francisco.42  These experiments resulted in the 
accidental death of at least one subject.43 
Easily the most well-known of any human experiment carried on 
by the United States is the Tuskegee Syphilis Study.  Beginning in 
1932, the United States Public Health Service initiated an experiment 
with 600 black males in Tuskegee, Alabama, the purpose of which 
was to study the natural history and progression of syphilis.44  When 
the study began, over half the men were already infected with the 
disease.45  In exchange for their participation in the study, the subjects 
 
 36. Id. at 316-17. 
 37. Id. at 317. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 319.  This much was admitted by researchers, who claimed that “[o]f the common 
laboratory animals, man appears to correspond most closely to the rat in regard to intravenous 
tolerance to uranium.”  Id. at 317. 
 40. MKULTRA is the most well-known of a series of CIA experiments that carry similar 
designations.  All of these involved testing the use of drugs or biochemical compounds on non-
volunteers.  ANDREW GOLISZEK, IN THE NAME OF SCIENCE: A HISTORY OF SECRET 
PROGRAMS, MEDICAL RESEARCH, AND HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 151, 153-55 (2003). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 158, 160. 
 43. Id. at 159-60.  For detailed information about the history of CIA human 
experimentation, see id. ch. 5. 
 44. Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., The 
Tuskegee Timeline, http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/od/tuskegee/time.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2008). 
 45. Id. 
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received free food and medical care.46  However, the true nature of 
the experiment was never explained to any of the subjects, and even 
when an effective treatment to cure syphilis was discovered, it was not 
offered to any of the study subjects.47 
The Tuskegee study went on for an amazing forty years before it 
was discovered and revealed by the press.48  The increased scrutiny 
and criticism of the study by the press and government advisory 
panels led to its immediate termination.49  Some compensation was 
provided to the victims of the study in 1973, but it was not until 1997 
that President Bill Clinton apologized for the injustice that had been 
done to the experiment’s subjects.50  The revelation of the Tuskegee 
experiments resulted in the passage of the National Research Act in 
1974,51 which created the National Commission for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research.52  In 1979, 
the Commission published the Belmont Report which identified 
“basic ethical principles” and applications of those principles that 
were relevant to human subject research.53  The recommendations of 
the Belmont Report were adopted by the Department of Health and 
Human Services and many other federal agencies and incorporated 
into their regulations.54  These recommendations evolved into what is 
currently known as the “Common Rule” for human research 
protection.55 
D. The AZT 076 Clinical Trials in Africa 
The next crisis in the history of international human subject 
research revolved around the most significant global health crisis of 
the late 20th century—HIV/AIDS.  In 1997, several of the specific 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. National Research Services Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342; Ctrs. for Disease 
Control and Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., U.S. Public Health Service 
Syphilis Study at Tuskegee, http://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/after.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2008). 
 52. Office of Human Subjects Research, Nat’l Insts. of Health, The Belmont Report: 
Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of Research, Apr. 18, 
1979, http://www.nihtraining.com/ohsrsite/guidelines/belmont.html. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Office for Human Research Protections, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 
Belmont Report, http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/belmontArchive.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2008). 
 55. Id; see 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2006). 
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ethical issues surrounding international drug trials became part of a 
passionate dispute about AIDS-related research.  The National 
Institutes of Health had funded a trial of a new protocol of AZT, an 
important retroviral drug used in AIDS therapy, in several African, 
Asian, and Caribbean countries.56  An earlier test of AZT Protocol 
076 had demonstrated a two-thirds reduction in mother-to-child HIV 
transmission.57  Because of the high cost of AZT and that fact that 
Protocol 076 was an intensive treatment regimen, the prospects for 
providing the drug to HIV patients in impoverished countries were 
bleak.58  Therefore, the new protocol involved a shortened regimen of 
AZT which was tested against a placebo.59  The trial researchers 
claimed that they were looking for a more cost-effective, and 
therefore more accessible, manner of providing treatment.60 
Several researchers argued that use of a placebo in these trials, 
given that a proven therapy was known, was unethical.61  The placebo 
arm of the trial, under the circumstances, would have been legally 
barred in the United States.62  The trial’s supporters were charged 
with applying a double standard and exploiting trial participants 
because of lower standards abroad.63  Opponents also claimed that 
even the shortened AZT regimen would have been too expensive in 
certain trial sites where the average annual health expenditure was 
only about ten dollars.64  Trial supporters fired back, claiming that the 
use of a placebo-controlled trial was essential in rendering a faster, 
more useful and scientifically reliable answer about the efficacy of the 
shortened regimen, and would, in the end, benefit the countries in 
which the trials were being performed.65  Trial researchers responded 
to charges of exploitation with claims that their opponents were 
“ethical imperialists,” seeking to impose Western standards that 
 
 56. AURORA PLOMER, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF MEDICAL RESEARCH: INTERNATIONAL 
BIOETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 114 (2005). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 115.  The cost per patient at the time was approximately $800.  Id. 
 59. Id. at 114. 
 60. See id. at 115. 
 61. Peter Lurie & Sid M. Wolfe, Unethical Trials of Interventions to Reduce Perinatal 
Transmission of the Human Immunodefeciency Virus in Developing Countries, 337 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 853, 853 (1997).  It is also important to note that in the earlier test of Protocol 076, once 
the dramatic efficacy of the treatment was discovered, the placebo arm of the test was shut 
down immediately.  Id. 
 62. PLOMER, supra note 56, at 114. 
 63. Lurie & Wolfe, supra note 61, at 855. 
 64. PLOMER, supra note 56, at 115. 
 65. Id. 
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would prevent the needs of developing world populations from being 
met.66 
In the end, the short regimen of AZT had rates of success similar 
to Protocol 076.67  Future clinical trials would compare the results of 
this short-course AZT regimen against those of even less intensive 
and costly regimens of competing retrovirals, such as nevirapine, 
which proved to be even more effective in preventing mother-to-child 
HIV transmission.68  This episode illustrates several of the enduring 
and relevant debates surrounding pharmaceutical trials overseas. 
E. The Contemporary Background of International Clinical Trials 
The pharmaceutical industry has legitimately earned its common 
moniker “Big Pharma.”  It has been the most consistently profitable 
industry since World War II.69  In 2005, global pharmaceutical 
spending exceeded $600 billion.70  This represents a growth rate of 
seven percent worldwide, but emerging markets in Asia, Europe and 
Latin America grew even faster.71  However, the development 
pipeline for new pharmaceutical products is a lengthy and costly one.  
The typical drug costs about $802 million over the course of its 
research and development, which lasts ten to fifteen years.72 
The most difficult hurdle for new drugs to overcome is Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) approval, the sine qua non of drug 
marketability in the United States.  The FDA approval process, which 
is overseen by the FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research 
(CDER), 73 consists of a series of four phases of clinical trials. 74  These 
 
 66. Id. at 116. 
 67. SONIA SHAH, THE BODY HUNTERS 97 (2006). 
 68. Id. at 98. 
 69. Annas, supra note 35, at 324. 
 70. Press Release, IMS Health, IMS Health Reps. Global Pharm. Mkt. Grew 7 Percent in 
2005, to $602 Billion (Mar. 21, 2006), available at http://www.imshealth.com/ims/portal/front/ 
articleC/0,2777,6599_3665_77491316,00.html. 
 71. Id. 
 72. PHRMA, PHARM. INDUS. PROFILE 2007, at 5-6, available at http://www.phrma.org/ 
files/Profile%202007.pdf. 
 73. See Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Admin.,  Frequently 
Asked Questions, http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/faq/default.htm [hereinafter CDER FAQ] 
(last visited Jan. 14, 2008). 
 74. Barr Pharmaceuticals, Proprietary Product FDA Approval Process, 
http://www.barrlabs.com/proprietary/approval.php (last visited Jan. 14, 2008); see also CTR. FOR 
DRUG EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., CDER HANDBOOK 19, 
available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/handbook/handbook.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2008). 
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trials test a new drug’s safety and efficacy. 75  The approval process 
also involves institutional review by the FDA, and meetings between 
the new drug’s sponsor and the CDER.76  Each of the first three 
phases of a clinical trial require progressively more test subjects, 
peaking at around 3,000 for a Phase III trial.77  Because not all 
patients who apply for a place in a clinical trial will be eligible, and 
many eligible subjects may not show up for their scheduled check-ups 
or follow the prescribed protocol, new drug sponsors may have to find 
many more willing subjects than the number required for the trial to 
get off the ground.78 
A problem facing pharmaceutical companies who need a trial 
with several thousand willing participants is that Americans are 
increasingly hesitant to participate in these experiments.79  The lack of 
clinical trial volunteers has caused a back-up in the “pipeline” of 
developing drugs.80  Though both the cost and the number of new 
drug trials have increased in the past few years, the annual output of 
new FDA-approved drugs has remained steady.81  The immediate 
effect of this trend has been to transfer the task of finding and 
carrying out new trials from academic medical centers, which the 
pharmaceutical industry saw as too slow to review and carry out the 
trials, to contract research organizations (CROs).82  CROs are 
independent contractors who perform the tests and compile and 
submit the results to the FDA on behalf of the drug companies.83 
CROs are more aggressive and faster in finding patients and 
carrying out the trials and were the main proponents of moving more 
 
 75. Barr Pharmaceuticals, supra note 74. 
 76. Id. 
 77. ClinicalTrials.gov, Understanding Clinical Trials,  http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/info/ 
understand (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).  Phase IV trials are post-marketing trials that test long-
term effectiveness and safety.  CenterWatch, Background Information on Clinical Research, 
http://www.centerwatch.com/patient/backgrnd.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2008). 
 78. SHAH, supra note 67, at 3. 
 79. See id. at 4-5 (noting that less than one in twenty Americans is willing to take part in 
clinical trials and less than four percent of cancer patients would participate in a new cancer 
drug trial).  Until the ethical reforms of the 1970s outlawed it, the U.S. prison population 
presented a “captive audience” of subjects for new drug trials.  Id. at 6. 
 80. Id. at 3. 
 81. Id. at 5. 
 82. Id. at 6. 
 83. 21 C.F.R. § 312.3(b) (2007) (“Contract research organization means a person that 
assumes, as an independent contractor with the sponsor, one or more of the obligations of a 
sponsor, e.g., design of a protocol, selection or monitoring of investigations, evaluation of 
reports, and preparation of materials to be submitted to the Food and Drug Administration.”). 
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clinical trials overseas.84  The role of CROs has plausibly led many 
pharmaceutical companies, including some industry giants like 
GlaxoSmithKline and Merck, to conduct between thirty and fifty 
percent of their clinical trials overseas.85  The number of clinical 
investigators overseas is growing too—up eight percent between 2001 
and 2003, with a corresponding eleven percent decrease in the 
number of U.S. researchers.86  New trials are generally moving toward 
more impoverished countries with larger “sick” populations—
including Russia, India, and countries in Eastern Europe and Latin 
America.87 
The shift of clinical trials to sites abroad has important 
implications for both countries hosting trials and those whose 
companies are sponsoring the research.  Overseas clinical trials may 
be cheaper than domestic trials and may also enable new drugs to 
reach the market faster, resulting in greater profits for the 
pharmaceutical companies.  The rapid approval and introduction of 
new drugs will likely result in increased health (or increased sickness 
if the testing is carried out poorly) for the populations to whom the 
drugs are marketed, which is not always the population on which the 
drug was originally tested.  For the countries that host the clinical 
trials, their health systems may receive valuable infusions of capital 
by pharmaceutical companies who are anxious to carry out trials 
using local populations and researchers.  The new drug and its post-
trial availability (or lack thereof) will affect health outcomes for the 
test subjects in the host country as well.  For these reasons and others, 
it is important now to ask what legal or ethical guidelines govern the 
conduct of clinical trials abroad and whether they are effective in 
regulating unethical or exploitative behavior by researchers. 
II.  DESCRIPTION AND COMPARISON OF MAJOR 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OR CODES OF ETHICS 
REGARDING HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION 
There are numerous important international documents that 
touch on human subject experimentation, and new instruments seem 
 
 84. See SHAH, supra note 67, at 6-7. 
 85. Id. at xi. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 7.  Shah also notes that many of the conditions that led these countries to have 
such impoverished and sick populations were the result of the interactions, such as colonialism 
and globalization, with Western countries that are now sending their pharmaceutical products 
across the world for testing.  Id. at 15. 
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to appear each year.  Not all of them can be mentioned here, nor can 
any one of them be examined in full detail.88  Instead, this Note looks 
at two of the most influential international codes of ethics and two 
others which represent new approaches by those who seek to protect 
human subjects from unethical research practices. 
A. The Nuremberg Code 
The importance of the Nuremberg Code (Code) as a point of 
departure for the bioethics and broader human rights movements can 
hardly be overstated.  The Code is recognized as “an authoritative 
statement of the fundamental rights of research subjects in all 
nations.”89  Further, the Code has influenced the development of 
subsequent human rights documents that go beyond the scope of 
human subject experimentation.90 
Aside from the Code’s significance and continued influence as a 
symbolic beginning to the regulation of human subject research, its 
content offers several points of comparison that are relevant to an 
analysis of subsequent bioethics documents.  The Code itself consists 
of ten principles, stated in simple and direct terms.  The first in order 
and importance says simply, “[t]he voluntary consent of the human 
subject is absolutely essential.”91  The paragraph which follows 
explains that the consent must be given by a person “so situated as to 
be able to exercise free power of choice,” free from “any element” of 
coercion and based on prior information given to the subject about 
the nature of the experiment, its purposes, and the risks involved.92  
The principle of informed consent is the Code’s “most important 
 
 88. See generally Sev S. Fluss, The Evolution of Research Ethics: The Current International 
Configuration, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 596 (2004) (containing a more extensive list of ethical 
guidance instruments). 
 89. Nicholas A. Christakis & Robert J. Levine, Multinational Research, in 3 ENCYC. OF 
BIOETHICS 1780, 1780 (Warren Thomas Reich ed., 1995). 
 90. The Nuremberg Code provisions have found expression in prohibitions on the use of 
wounded soldiers, prisoners of war, and civilians of an occupied state in non-therapeutic 
experimentation as part of the 1949 Geneva Conventions I (art. 12), II (art. 12), III (art. 13), and 
IV (art. 32).  Sharon Perley et al., The Nuremberg Code: An International Overview, in THE 
NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 2, at 149, 153-54.  The Code  also 
influenced the wording of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which states, 
“In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific 
experimentation.”  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171.  The use of the language of “free consent” is consistent with the language of 
the Code.  Perley, supra, at 153. 
 91. Nuremberg Code, princ. I (1947), reprinted in 313 BRIT. MED. J. 1448, 1448 (1996). 
 92. Id. 
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contribution” and has enjoyed wide acceptance in the research 
community.93  None of the other nine provisions of the Code 
derogates from the researcher’s “personal duty” to procure and 
protect the subject’s informed consent.  The rigidity of the Code’s 
requirements, and therefore the limits which it placed on research, is 
one reason why the medical research community has tried to 
“improve” upon it in other instruments.94 
In addition, the Code demands that research be performed “as to 
yield fruitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by other 
methods or means of study . . . .”95  In spite of the recognition that 
research ought to produce some benefit, the Code mentions nothing 
about the distribution of that benefit.  Moreover, the Code is entirely 
devoted to experiments performed on healthy patients.  No 
alternatives are mentioned for research combined with treatment, or 
therapeutic research. 
Though the Code is a legal document, produced as part of an 
international criminal trial, it has no legal force.96  A related criticisms 
of the Code is that the duty to follow its precepts is placed entirely on 
the researcher, who presumably is interested in the success of the 
experiment.97  Even as a document written by judges, it is to be 
entirely self-enforced.  The Code establishes no outside compliance 
review or method of sanctioning non-compliance.  Of this particular 
limitation, perhaps we should be more forgiving.  Though the 
Nuremberg judges intended to set forth ethical guidelines of enduring 
significance, it is important to remember that the Code was written in 
response to a discrete set of historical events, namely the Holocaust 
and the crimes of the Nazi doctors.  The judges were responding to 
the specific crimes and evidence before them.  The Nuremberg Code 
as a whole is a limited and simple document.  Future instruments 
have added detail and complexity to the principles announced first at 
Nuremberg. 
 
 93. Perley, supra note 90, at 155. 
 94. See infra Part II.B (discussing the Declaration of Helsinki), Part II.C (discussing the 
Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine), Part II.D (discussing the 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights). 
 95. Nuremberg Code, supra note 91, princ. II. 
 96. See Perley, supra 90, at 160. 
 97. See Nuremberg Code, supra note 91, princs. I, X (assigning to the researcher both the 
responsibility of obtaining informed consent and of determining when the experiment should be 
terminated). 
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The Code’s lack of legal force can be observed in the way it has 
interacted with the U.S. legal system.  On the legislative and 
administrative side, federal regulations depart from the spirit of the 
Code by introducing the responsibility of the research institution and 
the authority of institutional review boards (IRBs) in lieu of the 
Code’s emphasis on the researcher’s authority.98  In U.S. courts, no 
injured subject has ever been awarded damages, and no researcher 
has ever been punished based purely on violations of the Nuremberg 
Code.99  The Code has been mentioned far more often as an 
authoritative source in dissent.100  Perhaps the apex of the Code’s use 
in U.S. courts was its extensive citation in the dissenting opinions in 
United States v. Stanley, which involved the CIA’s MKULTRA 
experiments.101  The 5-4 majority denied Mr. Stanley, a soldier in the 
U.S. Army, any compensation for his injuries, but Justice Brennan 
(joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens) and Justice O’Connor 
would have used the standards of the Nuremberg Code to provide 
him with a right to damages.102 
B. The Declaration of Helsinki 
Because of the Nuremberg Code’s limitations and perceived 
flaws, medical researchers soon acted to create their own set of 
ethical standards.  In 1964, the World Medical Association (WMA) 
issued the Declaration of Helsinki (Declaration), which soon became 
the definitive statement of medical ethics regarding research.103  The 
 
 98. Leonard H. Glantz, The Influence of the Nuremberg Code on U.S. Statutes and 
Regulations, in THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 2, at 183, 187-88.  
The Nuremberg Code also has had great influence on the ethical guidelines promulgated by the 
National Institutes of Health.  Id. at 186.  However, this is of little concern to pharmaceutical 
companies, whose principal concern is FDA approval. 
 99. Annas, supra note 31, at 201. 
 100. Id. (also noting the irony that the Code has such little legal force even in the United 
States, the country whose citizens, judges, and procedures produced the Code in the first place).  
In one lower court case, the Nuremberg Code was cited as setting the standard of the required 
disclosure of risks by the researcher to the subject.  Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F.Supp. 1463, 
1470-71 (M.D.N.C. 1986). 
 101. United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 671-72 (1987). 
 102. Id. at 687, 690-91, 710. 
 103. See PLOMER, supra note 56, at 2.  The World Medical Association was organized in 
1947 as a representative body for physicians.  Id.  The WMA is comprised of national physician 
groups such as the American Medical Association (AMA) in the United States.  World Medical 
Ass’n – List of Members, http://www.wma.net/e/members/list.htm (follow “United States” 
hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 15, 2008). 
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Declaration has been revised five times since 1964 and has had two 
notes of clarification added.104 
As originally formulated, the Declaration placed less emphasis 
on informed consent than the Nuremberg Code.  From Nuremberg’s 
characterization of voluntary consent as “absolutely essential,”105 the 
original Declaration reads, “If at all possible, consistent with patient 
psychology, the doctor should obtain the patient’s freely given 
consent after the patient has been given a full explanation.”106  The 
Declaration also allows consent to be given by a proxy of the subject, 
in the case of legal or physical incapacity, something which the 
Nuremberg Code would not allow.107  In later versions of the 
Declaration, the sections on informed consent were strengthened, 
calling for “freely-given informed consent” either written or 
“formally documented and witnessed.”108 
One of the Declaration’s most significant contributions to the 
field of medical research ethics is the introduction of independent 
committee review of research protocols.109  According to the 
Declaration, the independent committee, known in U.S. regulations 
as an institutional review board (IRB), “should be in conformity with 
the laws and regulations of the country in which the research 
experiment is performed.”110  The use of foreign IRBs and the 
problems associated with them will be addressed in Part IV. 
As has been noted by ethicists, the Declaration of Helsinki is 
more permissive and paternalistic than the Nuremberg Code.111  In 
 
 104. PLOMER, supra note 56, at 3; World Med. Ass’n [WMA], Declaration of Helsinki, 
WMA Policy (Sept. 10, 2004), available at http://www.wma.net/e/policy/pdf/17c.pdf [hereinafter 
Declaration of Helsinki]. The revisions occurred in 1975, 1983, 1989, 1996, and 2000 with the 
notes of clarification added in 2002 and 2004.  Declaration of Helsinki, supra. 
 105. Nuremberg Code, supra note 91, princ. I. 
 106. WMA, Declaration of Helsinki, para. II(1) (June 1964), reprinted in 91 Can. Med. 
Ass’n J. 619, 619 (1964) (emphasis added), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/ 
picrender.fcgi?tool=pmcentrez&artid=1927433&blobtype=pdf.  The Declaration also places the 
provision on informed consent much later than the Nuremberg Code.  See id. 
 107. Id. para. II(1). 
 108. Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 104, para. 22.  Though the provision on informed 
consent is moved into the section entitled, “Basic Principles for all Medical Research,” it still 
appears in the latter half of the document.  See id.  The newest version of the Declaration still 
provides for proxy consent, but greater protections of vulnerable or incapacitated persons are 
provided in those sections.  Id. paras. 24-26. 
 109. R.V. Carlson et al., The revision of the Declaration of Helsinki: Past, Present, and 
Future, 57 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 695, 697 (2004). 
 110. Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 104, para. 13. 
 111. Annas, supra note 35, at 315. 
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part, this reflects the instruments’ different backgrounds.  The 
Nuremberg Code is primarily concerned with human rights, having 
been drafted by judges in one of the first human rights tribunals.112  
The Declaration, on the other hand, was created by doctors for 
doctors.113  The increased flexibility was intentional on the part of its 
drafters who represented the physicians’ interests and who felt that 
the Nuremberg Code was too rigid and legalistic.114 
The Declaration was signed by the United States in 1975115  and 
was incorporated by the FDA into their regulations for overseas 
clinical research that same year.116  In spite of having been adopted 
into FDA regulations, the Declaration is a general statement of 
ethics, not a collection of legally binding principles.117  Neither the 
WMA, nor the Declaration itself, have established procedures for 
enforcement or penalties for violators.118  Moreover, the United States 
has refused to sign on to the latest revision of the Declaration, 
because of the WMA’s insistence that research subjects should have 
access to the best current treatment rather than the best treatment 
which would otherwise be available to them.119  This change would 
have made it more difficult or impossible to perform placebo trials 
with new drugs if an existing remedy for the same problem already 
existed.120 
Where plaintiffs have brought claims against pharmaceutical 
companies for violations of the Declaration, the results have not been 
encouraging.  For example in Abdullahi v. Pfizer Nigerian nationals 
sued Pfizer, an American pharmaceutical company, under the Alien 
Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).121  Their claim was 
based on a drug trial of a new antibiotic, Trovan, which resulted in 
 
 112. See supra Part II.A. 
 113. Annas, supra note 35, at 315; Perley, supra note 90, at 157. 
 114. See Annas, supra note 35, at 315 (suggesting that the Declaration of Helsinki is 
different from the Nuremberg Code in two relevant ways, namely that the Declaration gives 
recommendations and that it is more lenient). 
 115. SHAH, supra note 67, at 75. 
 116. Id. at 133.  Each time that the Declaration was updated between 1975 and 1996, the 
regulations were also updated to mirror those changes.  Id. 
 117. See Perley, supra note 90, at 160 (“Although they are highly influential, neither the 
Nuremberg Code nor the Declaration of Helsinki has any legally binding authority.”). 
 118. PLOMER, supra note 56, at 7. 
 119. See SHAH, supra note 67, at 132-35. 
 120. See id. 
 121. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, No. 01 Civ. 8118, 2002 WL 31082956, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 
2002), vacated, 77 Fed. Appx. 48 (2d Cir. 2003) (vacating the district court’s order to dismiss on 
grounds of forum non conveniens and remanding). 
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the death or serious injury of at least eleven children.122  Under the 
ATCA, plaintiffs must allege violations of the “law of nations” which 
is comprised of norms which are “specific, universal, and 
obligatory.”123  The court allowed the Declaration, as well as the 
Nuremberg Code and other instruments, to be introduced as evidence 
of principles of customary international law, but eventually found that 
they were not sufficiently universal to establish a claim under the 
ATCA.124 
In addition to the basic principles announced in the Declaration, 
another international group, the Council for International 
Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS), in collaboration with 
the World Health Organization (WHO), has published its 
International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research involving 
Human Subjects.125  The CIOMS Guidelines give more detailed and 
specific practical guidance concerning the principles found in the 
Declaration.  For example, Guideline 5 sets forth a list of twenty-six 
items of information that a research subject must be provided before 
their subsequent consent can be considered informed.126  The frequent 
approving references to the Declaration throughout the Guidelines is 
evidence that CIOMS believes that the Declaration’s principles are 
the proper ones.127 
C. Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine 
Next, we turn to a recent European approach to the regulation of 
clinical trials—the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights 
 
 122. Id. at *1-2. 
 123. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 124. See Abdullahi, 2002 WL 31082956, at *4-6.  Civil and criminal lawsuits related to the 
Trovan study and brought by Nigerian government officials continue in Nigerian courts.  See 
Jacob Goldstein, Nigerian Judge Orders Arrest of Pfizer Officials, WALL ST. J. HEALTH BLOG, 
Dec. 26, 2007, http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2007/12/26/nigerian-judge-orders-arrest-of-pfizer-
officials; Joe Stephens, Pfizer Faces Criminal Charges in Nigeria, WASH. POST, May 30, 2007, at 
A10; Joe Stephens, Panel Faults Pfizer in ‘96 Clinical Trial in Nigeria, WASH. POST, May 7, 2006, 
at A01. 
 125. COUNCIL FOR INT’L ORG. OF MED. SCI., INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR 
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (2002) [hereinafter CIOMS 
GUIDELINES]. 
 126. Id. Guideline 5. 
 127. See, e.g., id. Guideline 13 (Commentary) (noting that the Guideline is “compatible” 
with the Declaration of Helsinki). 
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and Biomedicine (CHRB).128  The most obvious distinction between 
the CHRB and the other instruments above is that the CHRB is 
applicable only in Europe and only to those nations that are members 
of the Council of Europe.129  Currently, the CHRB has been signed by 
thirty-four of the Counsel of Europe member nations, but only 
twenty-one of the signing members, excluding important European 
powers such as France and Italy, have ratified it.130  In addition, 
Germany, Russian and the United Kingdom are among the nations 
that have not signed the CHRB.131 
The CHRB is a general human rights instrument concerning not 
only biomedical research, but also privacy, human genome rights, and 
the transplantation and trafficking of organs.132  The most relevant 
sections for the purposes of this note are Chapter V on scientific 
research133 and the Additional Protocol on biomedical research, added 
in January 2005.134  The Chapter V provisions are short and are 
primarily directed to problems of obtaining consent in the context of 
research.135 
The most useful details of the CHRB are added by the 
Additional Protocol.  The Additional Protocol provides for scientific 
and ethical review by independent committees.136  Committee 
examination is required in “each State in which any research activity 
is to take place.”137  Depending on the scope of the term “research 
activity,” which remains undefined in both the CHRB and the 
 
 128. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with 
Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, Apr. 4, 1997, Europ. T.S. No. 164 [hereinafter CHRB]. 
 129. The Council of Europe is often confused with the European Union, but the two are 
distinct.  The Council of Europe is composed of forty-six nations, more than the EU and 
including important countries not part of the EU such as Russia, Switzerland, and the former 
Yugoslav republics.  Compare The Council of Europe’s Member States, 
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/About_Coe/Member_states (last visited Jan. 17, 2008) with 
Member States of the EU, http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/index_en.htm (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2008). 
 130. See Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine Chart of Signatures and 
Ratifications, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=164&CM=&DF= 
&CL=ENG (last visited Jan. 17, 2008). 
 131. See id. 
 132. CHRB, supra note 128, chs. III, IV, VI. 
 133. Id. ch. V. 
 134. Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, concerning 
Biomedical Research, Jan. 25, 2005, Europ. T.S. No. 195 [hereinafter Additional Protocol]. 
 135. CHRB, supra note 128, ch. V. 
 136. Additional Protocol, supra note 134, arts. 7, 9-12. 
 137. Id. art. 9(1). 
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Additional Protocol (as well as their respective Explanatory 
Reports), this may include review in the country of origin.138  Another 
important provision added by the Additional Protocol says that 
research carried out by “[s]ponsors or researchers within the 
jurisdiction of a Party to this Protocol” that takes place “in a State not 
party to this Protocol” must comply with the standards of the 
Protocol if they differ from those in that non-party State.139  The 
drafters of the Additional Protocol were aware of the growing 
number of research projects being carried out abroad and the 
possibility of having different standards in different nations.140  Thus, 
these more stringent protections are of little value if ethics committee 
approval in the home country is not required or is weak and 
ineffective. 
A separate section, Chapter II, of the CHRB is devoted entirely 
to consent, but not solely in the research context.141  Because of its 
placement separate from the chapter devoted to research ethics, one 
can deduce that consent is an important and overarching concern for 
the drafters.  An Explanatory Report promulgated with the CHRB 
makes clear that this formulation of informed consent is meant to 
restrain physician paternalism142 and that the information given to the 
patient must be transmitted in a way that is tailored to the specific 
person to whom it is communicated such that they can understand the 
information and weigh the costs and benefits of the procedure.143  In 
the research context, consent must be “express[], specific[], and . . . 
documented.”144  Research on persons unable to give consent for 
themselves is severely restricted.145  For example, it may not be done if 
“research of comparative effectiveness” could be “carried out on 
individuals capable of giving consent” instead.146  Research is further 
 
 138. See Explanatory Report, Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, concerning Biomedical Research, Jan. 25, 2005, Europ. T.S. No. 195, para. 38 
(explaining that this would include ethics review in a State where participants are recruited even 
if the research is physically carried out in another place) [hereinafter Explanatory Report]. 
 139. Additional Protocol, supra note 134, art. 29 (apparently allowing higher standards in a 
host country to take precedence over the Protocol, but the Protocol must set the floor). 
 140. See Explanatory Report, supra note 138, para. 137. 
 141. CHRB, supra note 128, ch. II. 
 142. Explanatory Report, Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Apr. 4, 1997, 
Europ. T.S. No. 164, para. 34 [hereinafter Explanatory Report #2]. 
 143. Id. para. 36. 
 144. CHRB, supra note 132, art. 16(v). 
 145. Id. art. 6(2)-(4) (explaining that as in the Declaration of Helsinki, proxy consent may be 
given by an authorized legal representative of the patient). 
 146. Id. art. 17(1)(iii). 
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restricted to instances in which the protocol will produce a direct 
benefit to the patient, and if not, the research must have the purpose 
of furthering research that will ultimately produce a benefit to that 
patient or similarly afflicted individuals and present “minimal risk 
and minimal burden.”147 
The usefulness of the CHRB as a device to regulate unethical 
research is substantially weakened by the lack of an individual’s right 
to petition the European Court of Human Rights under the CHRB 
provisions.148  The court is authorized to give only an advisory opinion 
on interpreting the CHRB.149  Any enforcement of CHRB rights is 
left to the individual states’ courts.150  However, the rights contained 
in the CHRB can be asserted in the European Court of Human 
Rights if, instead of bringing an action directly under the CHRB, 
plaintiffs find a CHRB right that fits under one of the protections of 
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), over which 
that court does have jurisdiction.151  The Explanatory Report to the 
Convention expressly recognizes the possibility that principles of the 
CHRB can be introduced as evidence of the scope of protection 
offered by the ECHR.152 
D. Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 
Of the instruments concerned with international regulation of 
biomedical research the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and 
Human Rights (Universal Declaration) is undoubtedly the “new kid 
on the block.”  The Universal Declaration can be looked at as a 
culmination of some lessons learned from the past failures of other 
international bioethics instruments.  However, how much of an 
improvement it makes over other instruments remains to be seen.  In 
June 2003, the International Bioethics Committee (IBC) of the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) submitted their Report of the IBC on the Possibility of 
 
 147. Id. art. 17(2). 
 148. PLOMER, supra note 56, at 18. 
 149. CHRB, supra note 128, art. 29. 
 150. Id. art. 23. 
 151. See PLOMER, supra note 56, at 18. 
 152. Explanatory Report #2, supra note 142, para. 165 (“[F]acts which are an infringement 
of the rights contained in this Convention may be considered in proceedings under the 
European Convention on Human Rights, if they also constitute a violation of one of the rights 
contained in the latter Convention.”). 
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Elaborating a Universal Instrument on Bioethics.153  With the blessing 
of the Director-General of UNESCO and its General Conference, the 
IBC then undertook a series of consultations with member states, 
drafts, and intergovernmental meetings to discuss the form and 
content of what would become the Universal Declaration.154  Two 
years later, on October 19, 2005, the 33rd session of the UNESCO 
General Conference adopted the Universal Declaration.155 
As to the content of the Universal Declaration, one of the most 
striking differences between it and other bioethics instruments is that 
the Universal Declaration is “addressed to States.”156  In contrast with 
the Nuremberg Code or the Declaration of Helsinki, which are aimed 
at researchers or research institutions, the Universal Declaration aims 
to push change on a governmental level.157  The provisions for 
informed consent are similar to those found in the documents 
discussed above, including a requirement for “prior, free, express, and 
informed consent of the person concerned” for research-oriented 
treatments.158  For therapeutic, preventative, or diagnostic treatments, 
express consent is only recommended “where appropriate.”159  This 
kind of looser consent requirement could be exploited as research 
and therapeutic interventions converge.  In language similar to that of 
the CHRB, Article 7 provides “special protection” for persons who 
lack capacity to consent.160  Further, recognizing the special problems 
of vulnerable groups, perhaps especially the populations of 
developing countries, the Universal Declaration refuses to allow the 
consent of a community leader or authority or community consent to 
supplant the necessity for individual informed consent.161 
 
 153. UNESCO, Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, http://portal.unesco.org/ 
shs/en/ev.php-URL_ID=1883&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (last visited 
Jan. 19, 2007). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. U.N. Educ. Sci. & Cultural Org. [UNESCO] General Conference, Oct. 19, 2005, 
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, art. 1(2), UNESCO SHS/EST/BIO/06/1 
[hereinafter Universal Declaration]. 
 157. See id. art. 2(b) (stating that the instrument’s aim is “to guide the actions of individuals, 
groups, communities, institutions and corporations, public and private” whereas the CHRB was 
only directed to states of Europe). 
 158. Id. art. 6(2). 
 159. Id. art. 6(1). 
 160. Id. art. 7. 
 161. Id. art. 6(3).  However, if researchers feel it is appropriate, they may seek the collective 
or community consent.  Id. 
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The provision for ethics committees (Article 19) initially says 
that the committees “should be established, promoted and supported 
at the appropriate level.”162  Within that provision, it is not made clear 
what the “appropriate level” is.  Rather, in Article 21 on 
“Transnational Practices”, the Universal Declaration provides that 
research being performed in a country other than the one where the 
funding source is located should be subject to dual ethical review.163  
Furthermore, the Universal Declaration insists that the terms of 
research agreements be established by negotiation characterized by 
“equal participation” by the parties.164  Both of these sections seem to 
be aimed directly at two of the most serious problems with 
international clinical trials— the lack of ethical review in the host 
country and heavy-handedness and exploitation by the large 
pharmaceutical companies, many of which may have greater 
resources than the governments of the countries where their human 
subject research is performed. 
As noted earlier, the Universal Declaration is addressed to 
states, and its drafters have seemingly left the enforcement and 
administration of its provisions to the state-parties.  Article 22 says 
that “[s]tates should take all appropriate measures, whether of a 
legislative, administrative or other character, to give effect to the 
principles . . .” of the Universal Declaration.165  There is no reference 
to any international judicial or regulatory body in any part of the 
Universal Declaration.  Instead, the drafters seem hopeful that the 
benefits of “education, training and public information,” as well as 
international cooperation, will be sufficient protection against 
inappropriate and unethical research.166 
III.  ETHICAL PROBLEMS SURROUNDING HUMAN 
RESEARCH IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES 
This note now turns to specific ethical problems that characterize 
overseas clinical trials.  As in Part II above, every ethical dilemma 
associated with such research cannot be fully addressed here.  
Instead, this Note looks at four issues that are, arguably, the most 
important and in most need to be addressed by regulation and policy. 
 
 162. Id. art. 19 (emphasis added). 
 163. Id. art. 21(2). 
 164. Id. art. 21(4). 
 165. Id. art. 22(1). 
 166. See id. arts. 22-24. 
04__LAUGHTON.DOC 5/27/2008  1:29:05 PM 
2007] SOMEWHERE TO RUN, SOMEWHERE TO HIDE? 203 
A. Distribution of the Costs and Benefits of International Clinical 
Research 
The question of who benefits and who carries the burden of 
international clinical trials is crucial.  Clearly, the pharmaceutical 
companies and CROs that carry out the research at lower cost, under 
less scrutiny and with a more abundant population of subjects are 
beneficiaries.167  The populations of developed countries also benefit 
from new drugs that are developed primarily for their consumption 
without the need to subject themselves to the risks of clinical testing.  
The burdens of such research, however, fall disproportionately on the 
populations of the developing countries where more and more clinical 
trials are carried out. 
There are concerns that pharmaceutical companies test drugs 
that are unresponsive to the needs of the local populations in the 
developing countries where the tests are conducted.168  Bioethics 
documents have consistently recognized the need for the benefits of 
research to outweigh costs or burdens as to individual subjects.169  A 
more recent concern has been whether subject populations are 
receiving adequate consideration before, during, and after the trials.  
The most recent revision of the Declaration of Helsinki says that 
research is “only justified if there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
populations in which the research is carried out stand to benefit from 
the results.”170  One method of providing some benefit to subject 
populations is through post-trial access to the tested products or other 
proven treatments.  One of two new paragraphs in the Declaration of 
Helsinki concerns post-trial access to the best proven methods of 
treatment.171  Because of the burdens it allegedly places on the 
researchers and their sponsors, this addition has been one of the most 
contentious revisions of the Declaration in recent times.172 
The Universal Declaration also shows concern throughout for 
the needs of developing countries, stating that “[t]ransnational health 
 
 167. Carel Ijsselmuiden & Ruth Faden, Research and Informed Consent in Africa, in 
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 363, 369 (Jonathan M. Mann et al. eds., 1999). 
 168. Jack Killen et al., Ethics of Clinical Research in the Developing World, in 2 NATURE 
REVS. IMMUNOLOGY 210, 214 (2002). 
 169. Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 104, paras. 5, 16-18; Universal Declaration, supra 
note 156, arts. 3(2), 4. 
 170. Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 104, para. 19. 
 171. Id. para. 30.  A note of clarification was added to paragraph 30 in 2004, reaffirming the 
WMA’s position on the necessity of post-trial access.  Id. para. 30 n.2. 
 172. Carlson, supra note 109, at 702. 
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research should be responsive to the needs of host countries.”173  
Article 15 is explicit in declaring that the benefits of research “should 
be shared with . . . the international community, in particular with 
developing countries.”174  Article 15 goes on to enumerate various 
forms that such benefits might take, such as provision of new 
products, “capacity-building facilities,” and increased access to health 
care.175 
Debate on these issues centers on whether the benefits of the 
trial alone provide sufficient benefit to the local population if no 
access to treatment was available to that population prior to the tests, 
and whether any harm is caused if, once the trial is over, the situation 
is returned to the status quo ante.176  Research institutions and health 
care systems in developing countries can indeed receive some much-
needed investment and improvements through hosting clinical trials.  
Those benefits can then be passed down to the local patients that they 
serve.  Nevertheless, as it relates to post-trial access to the treatment 
itself, it seems cruel to introduce a higher standard of care to a sick 
population, which hopefully produces a higher standard of living, and 
to then abandon treatment once enough positive results begin to 
manifest themselves. 
It should be emphasized that the question of post-trial access is 
separate from the related and equally important question of whether 
the distribution of costs and benefits between the developing world, 
serving largely as “guinea pigs,” and the developed world, which is 
the primary consumer of new drugs, is a just one.  In the author’s 
opinion, there is something pernicious about this divorcing of costs 
and benefits.  From a historical perspective, it is reminiscent of a 
relationship between the developed and the developing world that 
was characteristic of colonialism in previous years and in the current 
era by the problems of inferior labor and environmental standards 
and human exploitation.  Post-trial access is an important goal that 
ought to be pursued, despite predictable opposition by the 
pharmaceutical companies.  As recommended by the Declaration of 
Helsinki, any provision for post-trial access should be made part of 
the ethical review process that precedes the execution of any trial.177  
Nevertheless, the provision of additional benefits derived from 
 
 173. Universal Declaration, supra note 156, art. 21(3). 
 174. Id. art. 15. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Carlson, supra note 109, at 702. 
 177. Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 104, para. 30 n.2. 
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participation in clinical trials, such as investments in infrastructure 
and capacity-building, should continue to be mandated by 
international guidelines, and such requirements should be introduced 
into domestic law.178 
B. Ethical Imperialism or Cultural Relativism? 
One of the most enduring and overarching debates regarding 
international clinical trials is the struggle between the search for 
universal principles and the need to respect diversity and pluralism.  
In this debate, it is important to remember that both sides are 
concerned about the exploitation of persons in developing 
countries.179  The universalists are concerned that researchers will take 
advantage of lower standards in developing countries to perform 
studies that would be unethical and impermissible in developed 
nations.180  The pluralists or relativists are worried that imposing the 
developed world’s norms and practices on the developing world is 
similarly exploitative.181  There are two principal questions in this 
debate.  The first question is whether the same definitions and values 
apply to concepts such as informed consent in different cultures and 
different populations.  This area will be discussed specifically in the 
context of informed consent in Part III.C below. 
The second question is whether the same standard of care should 
apply across cultures, especially in light of the different levels of 
prosperity and health care access enjoyed by those in the developed 
and developing worlds.  The argument revolves around whether 
developing country research subjects are entitled to the “best current 
treatment,” the standard which emerges from the Declaration of 
Helsinki, even if the best current treatment would not normally be 
available to that population.182  This standard would, with few 
exceptions, effectively eliminate the use of a placebo control group 
 
 178. At least one group of authors has recognized the superiority of this broader definition 
of benefits as opposed to one focused solely on post-trial access to treatment.  See Conference 
on Ethical Aspects of Research in Developing Countries, Moral Standards for Research in 
Developing Countries: From “Reasonable Availability” to “Fair Benefits,” 34 HASTINGS CTR. 
REP., 17, 22-24 (2004). 
 179. Christakis & Levine, supra note 89, at 1781-82. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 1782. 
 182. See Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 104, para. 29.  A version of this standard was 
added in the 1996 revision, but the outrage surrounding it emerged after the 2000 revision.  
Carlson, supra note 109, at 700. 
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where an existing treatment already exists.183  The question then 
essentially becomes whether the prescribed minimum is the best 
current treatment available anywhere, or the best current treatment 
available in the area where the research is taking place.184 
Both viewpoints in this debate have their costs and benefits.  If 
one insists that a universal standard of care should be imposed, this 
substantially raises the cost of the research and eliminates the cost-
saving incentive to perform research abroad.  If that position is 
combined with a commitment to post-trial access to treatment, the 
cost may become prohibitive.  We should not forget that the benefits 
of clinical trials to developing countries, such as those enumerated in 
Part III.A, would be withdrawn if such research became impossible.  
Using a current treatment, rather than a placebo, in a control group 
also makes discerning the scientific results more difficult; this explains 
one of the exceptions in the Declaration of Helsinki.185 
Observing a universal standard of care would certainly 
contribute to equality and nondiscrimination, two laudable ethical 
goals.  However, it may not be best for the long-term health of 
developing countries.  A contextualized standard of care, probably 
lower in developing countries, makes it more likely that research will 
be carried out in developing countries, with its attendant benefits in 
training and investment.  These material and educational benefits 
could be a more efficient contribution to future health outcomes than 
a universal standard of care during research, especially if post-trial 
access is not a viable option. 
While the Universal Declaration does not directly address the 
placebo-“best current treatment” debate, philosophically it is 
unabashed in its commitment to the search for “universal 
principles.”186  Article 12 of the Universal Declaration makes clear 
that “cultural diversity and pluralism” should not be used to “infringe 
upon human dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms, nor 
 
 183. Carlson, supra note 109, at 700.  A “note of clarification” added to the Declaration in 
2002 regarding the placebo standard added two circumstances in which placebos could be used 
even if a proven treatment exists: (1) for “compelling and scientifically sound . . . reasons” and 
(2) where the condition is minor and the control group will not be exposed to “any additional 
risk of serious or irreversible harm.”  Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 104, para. 29 n.1.  The 
CHRB Additional Protocol contains a similar but narrower exception, permitting placebo use in 
some situations.  Additional Protocol, supra note 134, art. 23(3). 
 184. See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH RELATED TO 
HEALTHCARE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 89 (2002). 
 185. See Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 104, para. 29 n.1. 
 186. See Universal Declaration, supra note 156, pmbl, art. 2(a). 
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upon the principles [of] this Declaration, nor to limit their scope.”187  
However, there is no infringement of human rights where people 
continue to be provided with a standard of care no less than what 
they had been receiving, while working to provide greater long-term 
benefits in the form of improved local health care systems or 
development of new treatments that will be made available to 
subjects in the future.  That being said, there is never an ethical or 
legal excuse to go below the local or national standard of care for 
treating a certain disease or condition in order to prove the 
effectiveness of a treatment that may not immediately be made 
available to the subject population.188 
C. Informed Consent 
Informed consent has justifiably been described as the “hard 
inner core” of medical research ethics.189  As mentioned above, in the 
Nuremberg Code, informed consent is the first of the essential 
principles of bioethics.190  Among the international ethical guidelines 
examined here, and in other ethical guidelines, there is no dispute 
about the necessity of informed consent in clinical trials.191  These 
instruments are also largely in agreement about the form and 
requirements of informed consent, even if there are differences as to 
some details.  For example, most recognize that additional 
protections are necessary for those who cannot give informed consent 
for themselves,192 and most recognize the right to withdraw consent at 
any time during the research.193 
Because of the acknowledged and agreed-upon centrality of 
informed consent as a protection for research subjects, it is vital that 
informed consent is carried into practice in an effective manner 
wherever research occurs.  Unfortunately, some data indicates that 
informed consent is not fully implemented in trials in the developing 
world.  One question is whether the consent is truly informed, or 
 
 187. Id. art. 12. 
 188. See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 184, at 95. 
 189. See SHAH, supra note 67, at 147. 
 190. Nuremberg Code, supra note 91, princ. 1; see SHAH, supra note 67, at 147. 
 191. Universal Declaration, supra note 156, arts. 6-7; Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 
104, paras. 20, 22; CHRB, supra note 128, arts. 5-6, 16-17; Nuremberg Code, supra note 91, 
princ. 1. 
 192. Universal Declaration, supra note 156, art. 7; Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 104, 
paras. 24-26; CHRB, supra note 132, arts. 6, 17. 
 193. Universal Declaration, supra note 156, art. 6(1); Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 
104, para. 22; CHRB, supra note 128, art. 5; Nuremberg Code, supra note 91, princ. 9. 
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whether it ever can be in developing countries.  In one survey, only 
sixteen percent of researchers claimed that they verified that a subject 
understood the procedure.194  Some researchers have expressed 
concerns that informing subjects in the developing world is futile due 
to linguistic or cultural barriers and low levels of education.195 
Another question is whether consent can be free in developing 
countries.  There is anecdotal evidence that in many instances, 
subjects feel coerced into participating or are not told that they may 
withdraw at any time.196  Part of this coercion can be due to financial 
or other incentives to stay in the trial197 or because subjects simply do 
not feel free to say no.198  Such unwillingness to refuse can originate in 
notions of the authority of Western doctors, the fallacy that a 
treatment will improve their health, lack of education, or structural 
issues in the culture or society.199  In fact, a survey in 2001 found that 
among researchers working in developing countries, “[forty-five] 
percent reported that their low-literacy subjects never refused to 
participate.”200 
The necessity of individual informed consent is another locus 
where the debate between universalism and relativism is played out.  
On one side are the drafters of the numerous ethical guidance 
instruments, who have acknowledged the necessity of informed 
consent.  On the other side, some researchers and CROs promote the 
idea that certain populations in the developing world are, because of 
culture, more docile and malleable than Americans and therefore 
better candidates for research.201  Others, including foreign physicians, 
believe that informed consent is a Western principle and is 
“unnecessary” in the context of other cultures.202  It is true that in 
some cultures personhood is defined differently than in Western 
cultures, and therefore the consent of the individual will not be as 
 
 194. SHAH, supra note 67, at 147.  Another study found that eighty percent of Haitian 
participants in a trial could not explain the basics of the procedure immediately after it had been 
explained to them.  Id. at 148. 
 195. Id. at 151. 
 196. Id. at 148. 
 197. Id. at 149 (giving examples of powerful incentives, such as money in poor countries or 
food where there is an ongoing famine). 
 198. See id. at 148-49. 
 199. See Christakis & Levine, supra note 89, at 1784. 
 200. SHAH, supra note 67, at 148. 
 201. Id. at 149 (noting a CRO executive’s opinion that “the Chinese are not that fully 
emancipated as in the U.S.” and are “more willing to be guinea pigs”). 
 202. Id. at 151. 
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important as that of the family or the community.203  Such dilemmas 
have also raised concerns that the overzealous pursuit of individual 
consent in a collectivist society could lead to the “weaken[ing of] the 
social fabric.”204  Nevertheless, the Universal Declaration rejected any 
attempt to circumvent individual consent or to use diversity as a 
pretext to “infringe upon . . . human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.”205  This leads to a larger discussion about the universality 
of “human rights” that is beyond the scope of this essay. 
For those who are strongly committed to the necessity of 
individual informed and free consent, the most obvious course of 
action would be to shut down trials in the developing world where 
such ideals could not be put into practice.  This seems too extreme a 
remedy, especially in light of the benefits that individuals and 
societies in the developing world can derive from participation in 
clinical trials and the practical necessity of their involvement for the 
development of new drugs.  However, any deviation from the 
standard of individual informed and free consent should be closely 
scrutinized by ethical review committees.  Those committees should 
be well-trained and should receive the relevant evidence from 
researchers, anthropologists, and others to decide whether such a 
departure is truly necessary. 
D. Deficiencies in Ethical Review 
As seen in Part II, one of the ways in which international codes 
of ethics and current FDA regulations differ is in the requirements 
for ethical review.  Both the Declaration of Helsinki (which the FDA 
has incorporated into its regulations) and the Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine provide for ethical review only by the 
country where the research takes place (the host country).206  The 
Universal Declaration, on the other hand, establishes a requirement 
of approval by at least two review committees,207 one in the host 
country and the other in the country where the source of research 
funding is located.208 
 
 203. Christakis & Levine, supra note 89, at 1783. 
 204. Id. at 1784. 
 205. Universal Declaration, supra note 156, art. 12. 
 206. Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 104, para. 13; Additional Protocol, supra note 134, 
art. 9. 
 207. In the context of the United States, ethical review committees go by the name of 
institutional review boards or IRBs.  See supra Parts II.B. 
 208. Universal Declaration, supra note 156, art. 21(2). 
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The idea that host countries should be the primary locus of 
ethical review has much to recommend it.  It is not unreasonable to 
assume that local IRBs will be more protective of their countrymen 
than will a group of foreigners.  Researchers as well as IRB members 
are often anxious to avoid allegations of “ethical imperialism” and 
ethnocentricity, terms that are often tossed around in the debates 
surrounding overseas clinical trials.209  Allowing the host country IRBs 
to handle ethical review by setting and applying their own standards 
is a convenient way to avoid such charges.  However, the implicit 
assumption of such a stance is that IRBs in host countries are as 
capable as those in the developed sponsor countries at protecting the 
interests and health of research subjects, or at least at protecting them 
to the degree that their culture requires.  There is significant evidence 
to the contrary. 
As mentioned above, a recent survey conducted by the National 
Bioethics Advisory Committee found that one-fourth of all overseas 
clinical trials went through no ethical review at all.210  That same 
inquiry found that several nations did not have ethical review 
committees and had no plans to create them.211  Even in those nations 
with committees, the review was largely ineffective, and there are 
several barriers that prevent ethical review from taking place in many 
countries.  One significant problem is a lack of capacity.  For 
example, doctors may lack training in medical ethics and good 
research practices.212  In some countries, like India, one of the current 
hot spots for medical research, the domestic medical association 
resists the imposition of minimum standards of ethics and practices.213  
Another difficult issue is the possibility that foreign IRBs will be 
unduly influenced by the resources of the pharmaceutical companies 
and the financial incentives being offered to their institution for 
participating in the study.214  The danger is that ethics committees will 
 
 209. See Ijsselmuiden & Faden, supra note 167, at 364, 369. 
 210. SHAH, supra note 67, at 136. 
 211. Id. at 135. 
 212. Id. at 117–18 (giving India as an example, where one of its foremost ethical experts 
pointed out that “[t]here is no ethics culture in the profession” and “nobody is trained in 
ethics”). 
 213. Id. at 114. 
 214. See GRAHAM DUKES, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
77-78 (2006); see generally Robert Gatter, Conflicts of Interest in International Human Drug 
Research and the Insufficiency of International Protections, 32 AM. J. L. & MED. 351, 353 (2006) 
(discussing generally the conflicts of interest due to the financial incentives offered to host 
country governments, researchers and institutions by biomedical firms). 
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“rubber stamp” unethical protocols, simply because they want the 
financial rewards of hosting clinical trials.215 
How could ethical review be carried out more effectively?  One 
proposal would be to follow the principles set out in the Universal 
Declaration. This would require that the sponsoring country (most 
likely an industrialized Western nation with greater review capacity, 
resources, and higher standards) carry out its own ethical review and 
protect foreign patients to the same degree that they would protect 
domestic patients.  While this would aid in harmonizing and, in 
general, raising standards across countries, forcing equivalent ethical 
review by the sponsoring country would eliminate some of the 
advantages that have created so much interest and activity in the area 
of foreign clinical trials.  An alternative or additional proposal would 
be to have those governments, institutions, and businesses that carry 
out or sponsor foreign trials contribute to the development and 
capacity-building for ethical review in the countries where such 
studies are carried out.  Their assistance should be both financial and 
technical.  The objective would be to create IRBs where none 
currently exist and to train and monitor the committees where IRBs 
are already in place but are ineffective in screening out unethical and 
exploitative research protocols. 
CONCLUSION 
This note has focused on how the standards and principles set 
forth in international bioethics documents can be applied to the 
particular problems affecting international pharmaceutical clinical 
trials.  The recommendations above are primarily ways in which 
governmental bodies, such as the FDA, international groups, such as 
the WMA and UNESCO, and private researchers can work towards 
the protection of human research subjects.  These measures should 
not be employed alone, ignoring a wide range of private responses 
that could be employed to encourage compliance and higher 
standards by violating companies.216  It is not a realistic solution to 
absolutely prohibit by law all overseas clinical trials, nor is that 
necessarily the most desirable outcome for the populations who will 
be the patients in the trial.  However, much can be done to offer 
 
 215. See SHAH, supra note 67, at 135-36. 
 216. See generally Finnuala Kelleher, The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Responsibility for 
Protecting Human Subjects of Clinical Trials in Developing Nations, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 67 (2004) (examining private solutions such as private litigation, market pressure, 
“shaming”, industry codes of conduct, and accreditation). 
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greater protection to international human research subjects and to 
make the distribution of benefits from global pharmaceutical research 
more equitable. 
